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ABSTRACT: Based on the writings of Judge Cunha Rodrigues, the author finds that due 
to the current prevalence of the case law of the Court of Justice on fundamental rights, 
the primordial establishment of the principles of primacy and direct effect. He draws 
attention to the functionalist consequences of the case law of the Court of Justice 
regarding the relationship between the Union and the Member States and the birth of 
the concept of Union citizenship, contributing to overcome what had once only aspired 
to be the construction of a common market. Finally, he notes the Union deadlock after 
the creation of the single currency, divided between developing the political project and 
the intergovernmental retreat, supported by national electorates. 
  




In addition to expressing my gratitude to Professor Alessandra Silveira, for her kind 
invitation to speak at this event, I would like to congratulate Judge Cunha Rodrigues, 
who throughout the years and despite the many duties he has taken upon, has been a 
beacon of lucidity and rationality against endless prejudice or extremist ideologies 
thinking. Credit is due to his understanding of the issues at stake but above all, how he 
succeeded in combining it with the logic, pragmatism and moderation, which have 
always set the tone of his discourse. 
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The following text is not a study, let alone an in-depth study, of any subject – but rather, 
it comprises of a series of reflections raised by the Judge’s reasoning and by some of the 
case law in which he has been involved. 
 
I 
The fundamental rights theme, as well as the underlying principles of the rule of law, 
take on great significance in modern societies – from it we can draw a balanced solution 
for conflicts and legal issues, and based thereon are the societies which respect the 
personality and the personal choices of each citizen, as one among equals. 
 
Amid talks of equality, legality, protection of legitimate expectations, prohibition on 
going beyond what is necessary and procedural guarantees, we do not merely address 
formal and heartless topics which must be observed through an innocuous command of 
authority – we speak of the Sermon on the Mount, from the Book of Psalms, we speak 
of Luther or Erasmus of Rotterdam, of Kant or Voltaire, of Teilhard de Chardin or John 
XXIII, of Hannah Arendt, and, in general, of humanity’s subtle path towards the decline 
of prejudice, moralism, extremism and violence, all in all, towards happiness and well-
being. As Steven Pinker mentions in his recognized work,
1
 we refer to the ability to put 
ourselves in the Others’ position, imagining how such position feels like. 
 
The subject made its way – the Court of Justice used to uphold, in earlier times, namely 
before 1969, that it was not within its role to apply or interpret general principles, 
relying on the defence or enforcement of such principles by other European or state 
authorities. The Internationale Handegellschaft judgement marked a turning point. 
 
As Judge Cunha Rodrigues already stressed, the establishment of the primacy principle 
has transformed the previous concept – firstly, because there were actual Community 
legislative or regulatory measures which could not be repealed or, due to their nature, 
could not be interpreted by national law; secondly, because fundamental rights 
effectively fell within the Community’s framework and objectives,2 in the sense that 
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primacy cannot disregard the individual rights laid down by the Member States’ 
national constitutions. 
 
Nevertheless, it took some time to arrive at the point where fundamental rights were 
considered as more than integration tools and were finally taken as subjective, 
individual rights which should, as such, prevail within the Community. Having as a 
foundation not only the Member States common constitutional traditions (precedent set 
in 1969), but also the International Treaties for the protection of human rights to which 
the Member States were signatories (since 1974, in the Nold judgement, the Court of 
Justice expressly refers to judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, and, 
since 1990, it includes such rulings in its own precedent). 
 
This did not invalidate the concept that «the objectives pursued by the Community» 
could constitute a limit to fundamental rights, for the legal precedent needed to make 
way for the establishment of the principles of primacy and direct effect. However, from 
very early on, there were two boundary conditions to the interpretation of Community 
law: the respect for the essence of fundamental rights and for the proportionality 
principle. In the Nold judgement, for instance, it was held that the fundamental right to 
property and the right to pursue a professional activity are prerogatives which should be 




Subsequent judgements settled an «equivalent protection» principle and, later on, the 
«highest level of protection» principle, uniting the Court of Justice to national 
jurisdictions and establishing a fundamental rights protection and enforcement principle 
surrounding the then Community legal order, i.e., comprising the known capacity for 
dialogue between constitutional traditions and the Courts themselves, along the line of 
the principles established by the Strasbourg Court. 
 
The full consolidation and validity of individual rights in the enforcement of 
Community law transformed the nature of economic freedoms, as mentioned by Judge 
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 on one hand, by enhancing their social impact, and on the other, by 
deepening the subjective dimension of economic freedoms. 
 
The first practical effect of this case law
5
 was an almost imperceptible, although 
significant, shift in power between courts, from the higher courts of the Member States 
to the Court of Justice, strengthening the legitimacy of the latter. The second was found 
in the functionalistic strengthening of the Community before the Member States, and of 
the Court of Justice before other Community authorities. At last, the reiterated path for 
the control of the compatibility of strictly national laws with Community law was 
found, i.e., without the mediation of an interstate or cross-border dispute on that 
intervention. 
 
The judicial tradition initiated in the Internationale Handgesellschaft and Nold 
judgements then functionally culminated in the creation and development of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (adopted in Nice in 7 December 2000). 
On the other hand, through the constitutionalisation of fundamental rights, this 
enhanced the primacy principle (for which judgements such as Factortame, Francovich 
or Simmenthal, among others, were instrumental), paved the way for a principle of 
weighting of rights and also for the arrival of other fundamental rights of political, 
social, cultural and economic nature, as well as the deepening of Union law in areas 
such as consumer or environmental law, and finally in issues related to new 
technologies, such as bioethics. 
 
As Judge Cunha Rodrigues
6
 correctly points out once again, the legal and institutional 
establishment of fundamental rights within the Union has made the concept of 
«citizenship» into the new benchmark and centre of gravity in judicial practice, 
resulting in what the author called a «constitutional arch», diverting the Community’s 
attention from the mere construction of an «internal market». 
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Currently, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, in the Lisbon wording, expressly 
recognises that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and the respect for Human Rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities; values common to the Member States, in a 
society characterised by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between men and women. 
 
Followed by the express recognition, in Article 6, of the rights, freedoms and principles 
laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, annexed to the 
Treaty and with the same legal value as the latter. Article 6 lays down penalties for 
Member States which depart from the values referred to in Article 2. 
 
As Takis Tridimis alluded to, today it can be said that the Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights share the same liberal background topics, a vision of 
democracy as not merely procedural, i.e., a majority rule through free elections, but, 
above all, with respect for the individual rights to be different, tolerance, pluralism and 
open-mindedness, i.e., democracy as a right to be different and unrestricted acceptance 
of others. 
  
In recent years, the progressive widening of Community responsibilities in the area of 
internal security and justice, led to the enlargement of the Court of Justice’s supervision 
in issues such as security and justice and, thus making these matters open to the vision 
permeated by fundamental rights, in such a manner that, within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
it is safe to say that the level of protection will extend to fundamental rights. 
 
II 
At a time when the European Union endures a crisis – although that has been the case 
since its inception, as mentioned by Jean Monnet («j´ai toujours pensé que l´Europe se 
ferait dans la crise et qu´elle serait la solution donnée à ces crises»)
7
 –, we should ask 
whether the role of fundamental rights will change, in times whereby the survival of the 
Euro remains uncertain. 
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Crises lead to migration – raising questions for nationals and non-nationals, which we 
wish to overcome through the creation of Union spaces. Consequently, the crisis leads 
to the restriction of emigrants’ rights and to the differentiation between nationals and 
non-nationals, as has been the case in certain national legislations. In the analysis of the 
Nation-State crisis, as a state exclusively for ‘nationals’, we can find one of the most 
exciting parts of the reasoning of one of the great intellectuals of the XX century, the 
expatriate Hannah Arendt. But let us turn the page. 
 
Obviously, when it comes to fundamental rights, they are better suited for a plastic 
judicial enforcement regardless of whether, or the manner in which, they bound the 
legislator. 
 
It is precisely in the judicial effort to soften, to alleviate, the legislative and normative 
tangle of the Union that we can envisage the need for a deepening of the fundamental 
rights theme. 
 
The executive bodies of the EU do not escape the general political trend to regulate 
everything, certainly in response to societies in which the political demand, the demand 
for a good political performance, has become widespread. 
 
The judicial practice does not intend to foster the complexity of solutions, but rather to 
achieve the fairest solution for each case, in view of the fundamental principles we 
share as a civilization – values which even take on a pre-legal dimension. 
 
The deepening of the fundamental rights theme, as they have been judicially enforced, 
does not favour indiscriminate claims, founded on the exploitation of small rules or 
successively modified laws, and in favour of manipulated or self-victimized citizens at 
the altar of the body of legislation. To look from a fundamental rights standpoint is to 
find acceptance of all and for all, and to enhance the tolerance to the frustrations that 
life in society has in store for us. 
 
From this standpoint, fundamental rights also have a say in the already mentioned 
«Euro crisis» – such an abstract matter, mediated by the banking crisis, the states, and 
the deficits, does not allow us to see the particular citizens hidden behind these major 
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institutions. A citizen who has suffered unlawful damages does not seem to deserve a 
different kind of solidarity than the one who is affected by unemployment, either by 
dismissal or by the lack of opportunities to find employment once again or to carry out a 
gainful occupation – especially today, when the service sector, to which the majority of 
graduates is dedicated to, has dwindle so much. 
 
Bearing in mind the unity of the European legal area and fundamental rights, we can 
currently monitor the frivolous distrust with which Europeans face the validity of what 
was supposed to be the constitutional treaty, fuelled by the focus on successive 
enlargements. The enlargements, by weakening the European unity have also, at least 
temporarily, weakened the functional model of collective evolution, the essential 
European «ethos», and bolstered the intergovernmental model (as was somewhat 
revealed in the step back materialised in the Lisbon Treaty). 
 
However, there is no alternative to the choices made by the peoples and their 
representatives. 
 
We live in a time when the moderation quality of the judge calls for soft law, to the 
right to have rights, as a counterbalance to the insecurity of laws and policies.  
 
At the same time, the reinforcement of the political dimension of the Union will 
contribute to the defence of the ‘Euro’ and also to the idea that Europe will not be, or 
does not necessarily have to be, 27 little exporting ‘Germanies’ – quite simply because 
such an occurrence is fairly unlikely and, for instance, vainly looked for in history. 
 
«Hélas», the possibility of a true European ‘step backwards’ must not be ignored, in the 
sense that the present day Union boarders might be reconsidered in order to give way to 
a ‘new Europe’ or ‘Europes’. 
 
However, a relapse towards a Nation-State is unlikely – primarily because warrior 
patriotism has become a troublesome relic and tyrannies are hibernating, and at last due 
to the particular shape of the European Empire (as defined by Ulrich Beck, a freely 
consented empire, which does not conquer, but instead calls for integration), is a shape 
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better adapted to the velocity of the future in the contemporary world and, in general, to 
the present reality marked by globalisation. 
 
Once again, we shall continue to favour the practical vision of Jean Monnet – «Ai-je 
assez fait comprendre que la Communauté que nous avons crée n´a pas sa fin en elle 





As always, the future remains open and, as in all human endeavour, it depends on the 
unpredictable – as the wisdom of the ancient Greeks already anticipated, it is not just a 
question of «agon», but also «alea». 
 
To Judge Cunha Rodrigues and to those present here, many thanks for your generous 
attention. 
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